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NOTES
Deciding Not to Decide: The Supreme Court's Expanding Use
of the "GVR" Power Continued in Thomas v. American Home
Products, Inc and Department of the Interior v. South Dakota
In the October 1996 Term, the United States Supreme Court
disposed of sixty-one petitions for certiorari' by stating that "[t]he
petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded .. for further consideration in light of [the
following legal development]." 2 The legal development referred to
by the Court is usually an intervening Supreme Court decision,3 but
can include a variety of events such as a state supreme court
decision,4 a new statute or agency interpretation,5 or a change in
position or confession of error by the Solicitor General.6 This
procedure of granting certiorari, vacating the lower court decision,
1. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Database (Oct. 16, 1997) (search for cases containing
"granted" within five words of "vacated" within five words of "remanded," with date
restriction in "DA" field for before October 1, 1997, and after October 1, 1996).
2. See, e.g., Thomas v. American Home Prods., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 282,282 (1996); Diaz-
Albertini v. United States, 498 U.S. 1061, 1061 (1991). The Court refers to this form of
disposition as a "GVR" because the Court "grants," "vacates," and "remands." See
Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 600, 602 (1996); infra note 7.
For general information on GVRs, see ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT
PRACrICE § 5.12(a)-(b), at 248-50 (7th ed. 1993), Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme
Court's Second Thoughts: Remands for Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases
Held for Plenary Decisions, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 5 (1984), and The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 92-99 (1961).
3. See, e.g., O'Leary v. Mack, 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997) (granting certiorari, vacating, and
remanding ("GVR'ing") in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)); see
also infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (discussing O'Leary).
4. See, e.g., Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v.
Continental Ins. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1731, 1733 (1997) (per curiam) (GVR'ing in light of
Maryland Court of Appeals decision); Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282 (GVR'ing in light of
Georgia Supreme Court decision); Alabama v. Ritter, 454 U.S. 885, 885 (1981) (GVR'ing
in light of Alabama Supreme Court decision); Conner v. Simler, 367 U.S. 486, 486 (1961)
(GVR'ing in light of Oklahoma Supreme Court decision).
5. See, e.g., Doherty v. Pennington, 118 S. Ct. 292, 292 (1997) (GVR'ing in light of
newly passed federal statute); State Tax Comm'n v. Herzog Bros. Trucking, 487 U.S.
1212, 1212 (1988) (GVR'ing in light of "proposed regulations formally published for
comment by the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the State of New York").
6. See, e.g., Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 117 S. Ct. 286, 286-87
(1996) (GVR'ing in light of Solicitor General's change in position); Lawrence v. Chater,
116 S. Ct. 604, 605-06 (1996) (same); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 405 (1981)
(per curiam) (GVR'ing in light of Solicitor General's confession of error).
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and remanding for reconsideration is what the Court refers to as a
"GVR."'7  The GVR is not a well-understood procedure, and
commentators have noted that the mechanics and use of it are a
mystery to most attorneys.8 This confusion seems surprising,
however, as GVRs have been issued regularly since use of the
procedure rose dramatically in the 1960s.9
The overall number of cases presented to the Court for review
each year has been steadily rising.10 Although various procedures
have been proposed to diminish this growing burden,"1 no major
7. See, e.g., Stutson, 116 S. Ct. at 602 (using abbreviated term to describe the act of
granting certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding for further consideration);
Hellman, supra note 2, at 5 n.2. Stutson is the first Supreme Court case that actually used
the abbreviation "GVR" to describe the practice. Search of WESTLAW, Scr Database
(Oct. 17, 1997) (search for cases containing "GVR"). Justice Scalia converted the term
into a verb--"GVR'd"-in his dissent in Department of the Interior. 117 S. Ct. at 287
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This usage has not gone unnoticed. See Robert Laurence, Straight
Talk- To-the-Point Observations About Eight Recent Cases on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Arkansas Law Review, 50 ARK. L. REV. 29, 58 (1997) (noting that
Justice Scalia "used the creative form 'GVR'd' for the past tense of the verb 'to GVR' ").
A GVR is sometimes referred to by commentators as a "summary reconsideration
order." See STERN ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.12(b), at 249; Hellman, supra note 2, at 6.
The term "GVR," rather than "summary reconsideration order," is used throughout this
Note.
8. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 5-6 ("[The GVR] remains a mystery to most of the
legal profession."); see also Laurence, supra note 7, at 57 ("[T]he so-called 'GVR'-
'grant, vacate and remand'-Supreme Court procedure ... is esoteric beyond the ken of
all but the best Supreme Court proceduralists, among whom I do not count myself.");
Theodore B. Olson & John K. Bush, Two Recent High Court Cases List GVR Criteria:
Court Clarifies when Recent Developments Justify Orders that Grant, Vacate, and Remand,
NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at B10, B10 (noting that the standard for granting GVRs has
remained "something of a mystery").
9. See Helhnan, supra note 2, at 7 n.11 ("Summary reconsideration orders were
extremely rare under Chief Justice Vinson (1946-1953) and in the first nine Terms under
Chief Justice Warren; no more than a dozen can be found in any one Term. The 1962
Term marked a turning point: there were more than 60 such dispositions."). Between
1972 and 1982, Professor Hellman notes that the number of GVRs did not drop below 40
in any year, and often exceeded 80. See id.
10. The first issue of each volume of the Harvard Law Review tracks the number of
cases of which the Court disposed. For example, in 1987 this number was 4401, and by
1993 it was 6676, a 51.7% increase. See The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 143, 354 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 376
(1994). While the increase can mostly be attributed to an increase in cases filed in forma
pauperis, the overall workload is still rising. See id. But see William J. Brennan, Jr., The
National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CIHI. L. REv. 473, 479 (1973) ("I can
state categorically that I spent no more time screening the 3,643 cases of the 1971 Term
than I did screening half as many in my first term in 1956."). It is interesting to note that
these numbers are in stark contrast to the paltry 87 cases the Court handled between 1790
and 1801 and to the 240 cases decided between 1862 and 1866. See STEPHEN L. WASBY,
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 146 (2d ed. 1984).
11. See, e.g., SUSAN Low BLOCH & THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER, SUPREME COURT
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changes have occurred in how cases get to the Supreme Court since
1988, when most direct appeals were eliminated. 2 In addition,
Supreme Court opinions that address the merits of a case are
becoming less frequent, now being handed down at a rate of between
seventy to eighty per Term, 3 as opposed to an average of 147
between 1971 and 1988.14 This increased burden and reduced output
suggests that the Court should benefit from methods of disposing of
petitions that may merit some action without granting plenary
review.15 Three such methods are to summarily reverse, summarily
affirm, or GVR.16  A GVR, however, differs from the other two
methods. While a decision to reverse or affirm a judgment generally
marks the end of the controversy, a GVR by nature will always
require further proceedings because a lower tribunal will need to
reexamine the case in a new light.'7 Therefore, the Supreme Court
issues a GVR when it "decides not to decide."' 8
Over the past few years, there have been a number of cases in
which the Court has debated when a GVR is appropriate. 9 This
POLITICS: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 602-31 (1994) (discussing proposals
to create a national court of appeals); Brennan, supra note 10, at 473-75 (discussing a
proposal to create a national court of appeals that would select cases for oral argument);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1417, 1417-20 (1987) (rejecting one plan to create an intercircuit panel to address less
important conflicts between circuits); see also John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts on
Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 182 (1982) (discussing a proposal to create a court
to decide certiorari petitions but not to have responsibility for deciding any cases on the
merits).
12. See Act of June 27,1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 1, 102 Stat. 662,662 (repealing 28
U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) and therefore eliminating most mandatory appeals). For a
discussion of this change, see H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 25 (1991).
13. See Olson & Bush, supra note 8, at B13. In the 1995 Term, only 77 decisions were
handed down. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996
S. Cr. REv. 403,403.
14. See Hellman, supra note 13, at 403.
15. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 100.
16. See STERN ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.12(a)-(c), at 247-51. In general, summary
reversals are "rare and exceptional." Id. § 5.12(c), at 251. State court decisions can also
be subject to summary reversal, but a number of Justices have disapproved of this
practice. See id. at 253.
17. See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's
Exercise of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 795,836 (1983).
18. In contrast, the question of which cases should have certiorari granted may be
called "deciding to decide." See PERRY, supra note 12, at 6 (explaining that before the
Court can make a decision, it must decide to review a case).
19. See, e.g., Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611 (1996) (7-2 decision); Lawrence
v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604 (1996) (6-3 decision); Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543
(1990) (per curiam) (5-4 decision); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (per
curiam) (7-2 decision); see also Marcia Coyle, High Court Debates Its GVR Power, NAT'L
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debate continues in two recent GVR orders issued on the same day.
In Thomas v. American Home Products, Inc." and Department of the
Interior v. South Dakota,2' the Court shed some additional light on
the nature and use of the GVR. In Thomas, the Court decided to
GVR in light of an intervening state supreme court decision that
conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit's prior determination of the
same issue.22 In Department of the Interior, the Court GVR'd for
reconsideration in light of a new statutory interpretation by the
Secretary of Interior that caused the Solicitor General to alter the
legal position argued in the lower courts?5
This Note first discusses the facts and procedural history of
Thomas' and Department of the Interior.' The Note also considers
the concurring and dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court that
accompanied both Thomas26 and Department of the Interior.27 Next,
the Note outlines the development of the GVR doctrine and then
analyzes how Thomas and Department of the Interior fit within this
framework.2 9 Finally, the Note offers recommendations based on
these developments to practitioners preparing certiorari petitions
that may be candidates for GVR treatment. °
Thomas v. American Home Products, Inc. addressed the
appropriateness of a GVR in light of an intervening state supreme
court decision.3 ' The underlying controversy in Thomas was a
diversity action regarding personal injury and products liability issues
that originated in the Northern District of Georgia. 2 The district
court granted a motion for summary judgment for the defendant,
American Home Products, Inc. 33 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at A14, A14 (noting a difference in opinion among the Justices over
the limits of the power to GVR).
20. 117 S. Ct. 282 (1996).
21. 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996).
22. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286-87.
24. See infra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 86-200 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 201-59 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
31. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
32. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The plaintiff "was blinded when the contents
of a floor drain violently exploded onto his head and face as he was attempting to place a
drain cleaner into it." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Thomas (No. 95-1826).
33. See Thomas v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 1:91-CV-0100-JOF (N.D. Ga.
filed Sept. 30, 1993), affd, 39 F.3d 325 (11th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision),
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affirmed without issuing an opinion.' However, the Georgia
Supreme Court thereafter decided Banks v. L C.I. Americas, Inc.
(Banks 1),31 in which it overruled the case upon which the district
court had based its reasoning. 6 Plaintiff's request for a rehearing was
denied by the Eleventh Circuit on the grounds that the Georgia
Supreme Court decision could not be applied retroactively.37
Thereafter, the Georgia Supreme Court handed down a follow-up
case to Banks I which held that Banks I should be applied
retroactively,3 8 making it clear that the Eleventh Circuit had
incorrectly predicted the view of the Georgia Supreme Court.39
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit "for further
consideration in light of" the recent Georgia decision regarding the
retroactivity of Banks L4  The seven-line order of the Court
prompted a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia and a dissenting
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Justice
Breyer.41
Justice Scalia's concurrence began by noting his prior criticism of
the Court's "excessive use" of the GVR.42 Because of this stance, he
vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 282 (1996), available in Petition for Writ of Certiorari
app. at 21a, Thomas (No. 95-1826).
34. See Thomas, 39 F.3d at 325.
35. 450 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1994) (Banks 1).
36. See id. at 675; Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282-83 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the
effect of Banks 1).
37. See Thomas v. American Home Prods., Inc., No. 93-9214 (11th Cir. filed Feb. 9,
1996) (per curiam), available in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 28a, Thomas (No.
95-1826); see also Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 283 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the
Eleventh Circuit's decision). Prior to this denial of rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit had
once already denied rehearing, see Thomas v. American Home Prods., Inc., 58 F.3d 642
(11th Cir.) (decided June 5, 1995) (unpublished table decision), but this denial was
recalled in order for the parties "to file briefs ... commenting on the effect of Banks [1],"
Thomas v. American Home Prods., Inc., No. 93-9214 (11th Cir. filed June 15, 1995) (per
curiam).
38. See Banks v. I.C.I. Ams., Inc., 469 S.E.2d 171, 174 (Ga. 1996) (Banks II). This
case was decided on April 29, 1996, two-and-one-half months after the Eleventh Circuit
denied rehearing. See id. at 171.
39. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1934), the federal courts in a diversity
action must apply substantive state law. See id. at 78. In areas where state law is
controlling and the highest state court has not spoken, the federal courts must determine
how the highest state court would decide the issue if reached. See 19 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507, at 115-19 (2d ed. 1996).
40. Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282.
41. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 282 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia likely was referring to his recent
dissent in Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611, 612 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that the outcome in two cases decided that day "are improper extensions of our
1998] 1391
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addressed why use of the GVR procedure was correct in this case.43
His opinion noted that GVR'ing has developed into a practice that
the Court referred to as "'customary procedure'" over fifty years
ago." Justice Scalia specifically noted that when a federal court of
appeals decision regarding state law seems doubtful because of an
intervening state supreme court decision, a GVR becomes
appropriate because a lower court with more experience in that body
of law is more capable of deciding such issues.4a Based on past
practice, Justice Scalia concluded that the GVR was correctly used in
this case because it was clear that the Eleventh Circuit had
misinterpreted Georgia law. 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent stressed that the petitioner's
argument did not meet any of the Court's guidelines listed in
Supreme Court Rule 1. 7 which discusses the considerations
involved in a decision to grant certiorari.48 In short, Rule 10 lists
limited power to vacate without first finding error below").
43. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Id (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324
U.S. 154,161 (1945)).
45. See id (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing cases).
46. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). This conclusion did not mean that the final
outcome was incorrect, just that the lower court should reconsider its outcome in light of
the new Georgia decision. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing that
GVRs do not necessarily require a different outcome on remand).
47. The rule is entitled "Considerations Governing Review On Certiorari," and it
states:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.
The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important
matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a
decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United
States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or
has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant
decisions of this Court.
A petition for writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of
law.
Sup. Cr. R. 10.
48. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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situations in which the Court will consider granting certiorari,
including a conflict between decisions of a circuit court of appeals
and a state court of last resort.49 Although the result of the court of
appeals in Thomas did conflict with the decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court, it did not conflict in terms of Rule 10 because it was
decided before the Georgia Supreme Court spoke on the issue.5
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that, under Rule 10, Thomas did not
resolve a conflict between circuits or between a circuit and a state
court of last resort, nor did it " 'depart[] from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings' " or meet any other Rule 10
consideration Because Rule 10 did not apply, the Chief Justice
suggested that certiorari was granted only to amend an incorrect
decision of the court of appeals. 2 However, he argued that granting
certiorari was inappropriate because the Supreme Court does not
have "a stake in the correctness of discrete state-law decisions by
federal courts, nor, in such cases, any' "obligat[ion] to weigh justice
among contesting parties." '" 53
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that because the Court would
not grant certiorari in order to either reverse or summarily reverse
49. See Sup. Cr. R. 10. Other situations noted by Rule 10 include (1) a conflict
between circuit courts of appeals on an important matter, (2) a decision of a circuit court
of appeals that is "far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," (3) a decision of a state court of last resort that decides an important
federal question and is in conflict with a circuit court of appeal or other state court of last
resort decision, (4) a decision of a state court or circuit court of appeal on an important
federal question that the Supreme Court has not yet, but should address, and (5) a
decision of a state court or a circuit court of appeal on an important federal question that
conflicts with Supreme Court decisions. Id.
50. See Thomas v. American Home Prods., Inc., No. 93-9214 (11th Cir. filed Feb. 9,
1996) (per curiam) (concluding that Banks I does not apply retroactively); Banks v. I.C.I.
Ams., Inc., 469 S.E.2d 171, 171 (Ga. 1996) (Banks fl) (holding, on April 29, 1996, that
Banks I does apply retroactively).
51. Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting SUP. Cr. R. 10).
52. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611,
611 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in No. 94-9323 and dissenting in No. 94-8988)
(alteration in original) (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT 997-98 (1939))). Justice Rehnquist's concern echoes the Court's oft
repeated claim that its "function is not 'to correct every perceived error coming from the
lower ... courts' but is instead to decide 'cases of broad significance.'" WASBY, supra
note 10, at 21 (quoting Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 368 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)); see also PERRY, supra note 12, at 36 ("Time and again my informants-
justices and clerks-stated that the Supreme Court was not there to ensure justice.");
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, Address Before the American
Bar Association (Sept. 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. at v, vi (1949) ("The Supreme Court is not,
and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court
decisions.").
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the court of appeals on Georgia law due to the court of appeals
having superior knowledge in that field, the Court should not issue a
GVR just because such a result seems easy.-' He noted that a GVR
looked palatable because the Eleventh Circuit had clearly ruled the
wrong way on the retroactivity issue and the petitioners'
supplemental brief was unopposed.' However, he noted two adverse
consequences: (1) that this decision will encourage other parties to
file for certiorari in cases with "more dubious" intervening events,
and (2) that a GVR such as this one requires a busy court of appeals
to do extra work to reassess a state-law case.56
Justice Scalia's concurrence addressed a few of the Chief
Justice's concerns. As to the lack of Rule 10 considerations in this
case, he noted that Rule 10 is not controlling, but merely indicates
why cases are granted plenary consideration, which would not be
applicable to a GVR order. 7 In fact, he noted that most GVRs do
not satisfy Rule 10.58 As to addressing state-law decisions, Justice
Scalia noted that GVR'ing in light of an intervening state supreme
court decision is akin to GVR'ing in light of an intervening Supreme
54. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 284-85 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
55. See id. at 285 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The petition for certiorari was filed
May 9, 1996, and the respondent filed a brief in opposition afterwards. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 1, Thomas (No. 95-1826). The petitioner filed a supplemental brief
on June 13, 1996, after Banks II was published, and this brief was unopposed. See
Supplemental Brief to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Thomas (No. 95-1826). If
petitioner's claim did not meet any Rule 10 consideration, perhaps the respondent
expected that certiorari would be denied. Cf. Timothy S. Bishop, Opposing Certiorari in
the U.S. Supreme Court, LITIGATION, Winter 1994, at 31, 32 (advising practitioners that
"[i]f there is general agreement that the petition is obviously meritless, talk to your client
about whether the time and expense of preparing and printing a brief in opposition is
warranted").
56. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 285 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).' As to the busy
workload of the courts of appeals, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a "typical active
judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit participates in somewhere
between 150 and 200 panel decisions each year." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see
also WASBY, supra note 10, at 43 (noting a 400% overall increase in the number of cases
docketed in the courts of appeals each year between 1960 to 1980). The courts of appeals
decided approximately 10,000 cases per year in the 1970s; they currently decide over
25,000. See Hellman, supra note 13, at 404. For a general review of the federal courts'
caseload problem, see RICHARD POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 53-86 (1996).
57. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 283 (Scalia, J., concurring). Note that Rule 10 does not
state that its considerations apply only to cases of plenary review. On its face, the rule
attempts to state reasons for granting certiorari and does not differentiate by whether the
case will be disposed of summarily. See Sup. Cr. R. 10; supra note 47 (quoting SUP. Cr.
R. 10).
58. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 283 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing cases).
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Court decision, which the Court does often.5 9 He reasoned that there
is "no possible reason" to deny a GVR in the former instance yet
grant one in the latter, "unless ... we have less regard for federal
courts' application of state law than for their correct application of
federal law-an attitude we should certainly not acknowledge."60
Addressing Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern about a flood of cases
regarding questions of state law, Justice Scalia claimed that such a
result would not occur because Thomas reflects the current practice
of the Court and that petitions raising more "dubious" grounds
should simply be denied certiorari.61
In Department of the Interior v. South Dakota,62 the Court
examined a separate area of GVR activity, handing down a GVR in
light of a new position of the Solicitor General due to a new agency
interpretation of a federal statute.63 In 1990, the United States
Department of the Interior ("the Department"), acting under § 5 of
the Indians Reorganizations Act of 1934 ("IRA"),' began an action
to acquire ninety-one acres of land in trust for the Lower Brule Tribe
of Sioux Indians.65 Afterwards, South Dakota brought suit and
argued in district court that, inter alia, the IRA was unconstitutional
because it was an improper delegation of legislative power.66 The
district court rejected this challenge, holding that the statute was
59. See icL (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 283-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996).
63. See id. at 286 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Indians Reorganizations Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994)). The statute states, in relevant part:
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to acquire,
through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in
lands ... within or without existing reservations ... for the purpose of providing
land for Indians.
25 U.S.C. § 465 (1994).
65. See South Dakota v. United States Department of the Interior, No. Civ. 92-3023
(D.S.D. filed Apr. 1, 1994) (mem.), rev'd, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996), available in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. B, at
32a, Department of the Interior (No. 95-1956). The land, which was next to an interstate
highway, was slated for development by the tribe as an industrial park, but the State of
South Dakota believed that the tribe was planning to put a gaming casino on the site. See
id., available in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. B, at 33a; see also Department of the
Interior, 69 F.3d at 880 (discussing background history of the case).
66. See Department of the Interior, No. Civ. 92-3023, available in Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari app. B, at 49a. The district court also considered and rejected South Dakota's
constitutional claims that the taking was beyond the power of Congress and that it
violated the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See id., available in
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. B, at 46a-49a.
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constitutionally valid67 and that South Dakota's other challenges to
the land acquisition were barred under the Quiet Title Act
("QTA"),6 which operated to prevent judicial review.69 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit struck down the statute as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.70 Although the court of appeals did
not consider the applicability of the QTA to bar judicial review, it
noted that the Department's claim that judicial review was
unavailable under the IRA was a factor in evaluating a nondelegation
claim.71
67. See id, available in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. B, at 51a. The district
court reasoned that § 5 was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
because the IRA "clearly delineates the general policy to be applied and the bounds of
that delegated authority." Id. (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73
(1946)). The Supreme Court has used similar language to test the constitutionality of
statutes that delegate responsibilities to an agency. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America
Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212,219 (1989) ("It is 'constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly
delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of
this delegated authority.'" (quoting American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90,
105 (1946))).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1994). The Eleventh Circuit has said that this act provides the
exclusive method for challenging title to land held by the United States. See Florida
Dep't of Bus. Reg. v. Department of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citing Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273,286 (1983)).
69. See Department of the Interior, No. Civ. 92-3023, available in Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari app. B, at 51a. The other claims were that the agency violated internal rules of
procedure and allowed the Assistant Secretary of the Interior to act outside the scope of
his delegated authority, that the approval of the acquisition was arbitrary and capricious,
and that other relevant statutes were not complied with. See id., available in Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari app. B, at 46a. Once the district court found that QTA barred a
challenge to the acquisition of land pursuant to the IRA and further held that § 5 of the
IRA was constitutional, it granted the Department's motion to dismiss the case. See id.,
available in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. B, at 51a.
70. See Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d at 880. The United States Supreme Court
has not found a federal statute to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
for over 60 years, since A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 508
(1935) (holding 15 U.S.C. § 709 (1933) unconstitutional due to lack of specificity), and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432-33 (1935) (striking down 15 U.S.C. § 703
because it was too broad and lacked restrictions). See Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d
at 881. Therefore, in more colorful terms, the Eighth Circuit holding "upset the legal
apple cart." Laurence, supra note 7, at 57. The Eighth Circuit recognized this fact, but it
also noted that § 5 of the IRA was originally passed by the same Congress that enacted
the broad statutes struck down in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining. See
Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d at 881. For a full discussion of the Eighth Circuit
decision, see Jessica Roff, Note, South Dakota v. United States Department of Interior:
Another Broken Promise to the United States Indians, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 453 (1997).
71. See Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d at 881-82 ("[W]hen the Secretary argued
to the district court that his actions under [§ 5 of the IRA] may not be judicially reviewed
because the statute commits them entirely to agency discretion, he implicitly acknowledged
that this delegation issue requires a particularly close look."). This refers to the
Department's claim that the APA barred review, not the district court's conclusion that
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Throughout the litigation, the Department contended that
decisions to acquire land under § 5 of the IRA were not reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").72 However, after
the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Department decided that such
decisions were subject to judicial review under the APA before title
was acquired, and it promulgated a new regulation to this effect.73
Based on this new regulation, the Office of Solicitor General, as
representative for the Department, changed its position on
reviewability.74 On petition for certiorari, and upon the request of
the Solicitor General, the Court issued a GVR order, with further
directions for the Eighth Circuit to remand the matter to the
Secretary of Interior "for reconsideration of his administrative
decision" to acquire the land.75 Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined.76
Justice Scalia stated that use of the GVR mechanism in this
the QTA barred review. See id. at 880. Examining the language of § 5, the Eighth Circuit
thought it so broad that "it would permit the Secretary to purchase the Empire State
Building in trust for a tribal chieftain as a wedding present." Id. at 882. Therefore, under
such a broad interpretation, the court of appeals found the statute to be invalid under a
number of "nondelegation criteria," such as the failure to provide an intelligible principle
to guide decisionmaking. See id. at 884-85.
72. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994) (requiring, in conjunction with
5 U.S.C. § 706, that agency actions be subject to judicial review unless "committed to
agency discretion by law").
73. The regulation states in part:
(b) Following completion of the Title Examination ... the Secretary shall
publish in the Federal Register, or in a newspaper.., a notice of his/her decision
to take land into trust under this part. The notice will state that a final agency
determination ... has been made and that the Secretary shall acquire title in the
name of the United States no sooner than 30 days after the notice is published.
Title Examination Rule, 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) (1996). The Department described the
regulation as follows:
This rule establishes a 30-day waiting period after final administrative decisions
to acquire land into trust under the [IRA] and other federal statutes. The
Department is establishing this waiting period so that parties seeking review of
final decisions by the Interior Board of Indian Appeals ... will have notice of
administrative decisions to take land into trust before title is actually
transferred. This notice allows interested parties to seek judicial ... review
under the Administrative Procedure Act and applicable regulations.
61 Fed. Reg. 18,082, 18,082 (1996). The Department specifically noted that the regulation
was being adopted in response to the Eighth Circuit decision. See id.
74. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23-27, Department of the Interior (No. 95-
1956).
75. Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286 (1996). Other Indian tribes filed
amicus curiae briefs requesting that the Court grant certiorari, but they did not request a
GVR. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 8-9, Department of the Interior (No. 95-
1956).
76. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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situation was "unprecedented and inexplicable."' 77 He first noted that
the Court previously had GVR'd cases when the Solicitor General
had asserted a new position after prevailing below.78 However,
Justice Scalia claimed that a GVR had never before been granted
when the Government had changed its position after losing below-
thereby allowing the Government to litigate on the most desirable
but perhaps less plausible theory first, and then come back to
relitigate on a new theory if it lost.79
Justice Scalia found the decision all the more confusing because
the Government's change in position could not alter the acquisitions
at issue in the case. Since the Department's acquisition was already
final before the litigation began, he noted that judicial review was
unavailable. 0 Further, he asserted that because the Department's
decision to allow judicial review was "discretionary," it could not
affect the constitutionality of the statute.81
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that a GVR was inappropriate here
because the new regulation would apply only to "'all pending and
future trust acquisitions.' "I He reasoned that the Government's
request for a GVR could not be reconciled with its position that
review is unavailable after acquisition of land under QTA.83
Asserting that the Court lacked the authority to GVR in order to
"construct the necessary conditions for judicial review,"'  Justice
77. Id. at 287 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611, 613
(1996); Schmidt v. Espy, 115 S. Ct. 43, 43 (1994); Wells v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1609,
1609 (1994); Reed v. United States, 510 U.S. 1188, 1188 (1994); Chappell v. United States,
494 U.S. 1075,1075 (1990)).
79. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See icL at 287-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia referred to this regulation
as "discretionary," but the regulation allowing for judicial review does not contain any
such language. See Title Examination Rule, 25 CFR § 151.12(b) (1997). In fact, the
regulation provides that notice "shall" be published in the Federal Register so that
judicial review under the APA is possible. See id. Therefore, Justice Scalia may mean
that the decision to provide notice is not compelled by § 5 of the IRA and that, as a result,
provision of such notice cannot affect the constitutionality of the IRA. Of course,
another view may be that § 5 does require notice and that therefore the new regulation
would not be discretionary and could affect the constitutionality of the statute. Because
the Court did GVR, it suggests that the Court thought the new regulation may have made
a difference. Cf. Gomez v. Fierro, 117 S. Ct. 285,285-86 (1997) (GVR'ing in light of new
state statute about a method of carrying out the death penalty after the court of appeals
held that use of the gas chamber for carrying out the death penalty is unconstitutional).
82. Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 288 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 61
Fed. Reg. 18.082, 18,083 (1996) (emphasis added)).
83. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia concluded by saying he would have granted certiorari because
a federal statute had been held unconstitutional.8 5
The Supreme Court's authority to GVR and to otherwise
summarily dispose of a case is confirmed by statute at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106, which recognizes the power to "affirm, modify, vacate, set
aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order ... and may remand
... or require ... such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances. ' 86 The Court has recently noted that, on its
face, § 2106 appears to give broad authority to remand any case
properly before itY On the other hand, at least two current Justices
believe that the prior practice of the Court should place implicit
limits on GVR use,88 and Chief Justice Rehnquist has pointed to Rule
10 as another limitation. 9 If we assume that the Court has a broad
power to GVR, it is useful to examine the circumstances that
normally precipitate such an order, as well as recent developments in
GVR use, in order to predict which cases are appropriate for GVR
treatment.
When deciding to summarily dispose of a certiorari petition, one
Supreme Court Justice has divulged that a convention exists that six
Justices, instead of a simple majority of five, must vote in favor of it.90
This type of rule, which deviates from the simple majority needed for
deciding typical cases,91 is similar to the better-known requirement
85. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). It perhaps would have been more precise for
Justice Scalia to say he would have granted certiorari and scheduled the case for oral
argument, since a GVR by definition requires that certiorari be granted. For the later
history of Department of the Interior on remand, see infra notes 248-50 and accompanying
text.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994).
87. See Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604, 606 (1996) (GVR'ing in light of new
interpretation of Social Security Act by Social Security Administration).
88. See Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611, 612 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that "[t]his facially unlimited statutory
text is subject to the implicit limitations imposed by traditional practice and by the nature
of the appellate system created by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id/
(Scalia, J., dissenting). As a simple example, Justice Scalia noted that the statute does not
allow the Supreme Court to reverse any decision without finding "a controlling error of
law." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
90. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 100. Professor Perry's interviews with Justices and
law clerks were confidential, so it is impossible to tell which Justice revealed this practice.
See id. at 18. Stern suggests that this rule is based on an "informal understanding." See
STERN ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.12, at 247. However, because some GVRs are five-to-
four decisions, any "rule of six" may not be so strong. See infra note 94.
91. See WILLIAM C. LOUTHAN, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
LAWMAKING IN THE THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 78 (1991) (noting that the Court
has always decided cases by a majority vote); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECIsION: How
1998] 1399
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that only four Justices are needed to grant certiorari.92 The "rule of
six" for summary disposition may have influenced the outcome of
Department of the Interior because three Justices, the maximum
number possible, dissented. 93 Presumably, if four Justices did not
want to GVR the petition, oral argument would have been scheduled
followed by a decision on the merits.94 Therefore, to the extent that
this "rule of six" exists, it would suggest that a GVR will not be
handed down by a closely divided Court.
Although the intervening events that precipitate a GVR can be
organized into several categories,95 the most common type of GVR is
one granted because of an intervening Supreme Court decision.96 In
fact, in the 1996 Term, eighty percent of GVR orders fit in this
category.9 These GVRs often occur when the Court waits to decide
a petition for certiorari in order to dispose of it in light of an
upcoming plenary Supreme Court decision.9" For example, in the
THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 6 (1996) (noting Justice Brennan's statement that
"[flive votes can do anything around here").
92. See BLOCH & KRATTENMAKER, supra note 11, at 337 (discussing the "Rule of
Four").
93. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas); see also Conner v. Simler, 367 U.S. 486, 486
(1961) (having three Justices dissent from a GVR).
94. However, there are cases when a "rule of six" must have been disregarded since
four Justices dissented to a GVR. See Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 545 (1990)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (joined by three other Justices); Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by three other Justices);
Oregon State Penitentiary v. Hammer, 434 U.S. 945, 945 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(joined by three other Justices).
95. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
96. See Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611, 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that this type is "undoubtedly the largest category of 'GVRs' that now exists"); Hellman,
supra note 17, at 836 (describing the GVR as an order granted in light of an intervening
Supreme Court decision, but noting that other types of GVRs exist). Many examples
exist of GVRs in this category. See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996); Exxon Corp. v. Youell, 116 S. Ct. 43 (1995);
Kapoor v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 43 (1995); Edmond v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 43
(1995); Pacesetter Constr. Co. v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Conference Bd., 116 S.
Ct. 43 (1995); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995); Calamia v.
Singletary, 514 U.S. 1124 (1995); Goldbaum v. United States, 348 U.S. 905 (1955); Amer
v. Superior Court, 334 U.S. 813 (1948).
97. Forty-nine of 61 GVRs fit this category. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Database
(Oct. 16, 1997) (search for cases containing "granted" within five words of "vacated"
within five words of "remanded," with date restriction in "DA" field for before October
1, 1997, and after October 1, 1996).
98. See STERN ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.9, at 243-44 (describing the practice of
holding cases); Hellman, supra note 2, at 21-29 (discussing "held cases"). In the 1996
Term, the Court issued GVRs based on 31 Supreme Court decisions that were decided
during the 1995 and 1996 Terms. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Database (Oct. 16, 1997)
(search for cases containing "granted" within five words of "vacated" within five words of
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1995 Term, the Court held about twenty petitions raising issues
similar to those in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 9 and it
subsequently issued GVRs in six of those cases after BMW was
handed down.'"
The recent GVR issued in O'Leary v. Mack'01 illustrates a typical
use of the GVR in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision.
The Seventh Circuit construed the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act ("RFRA")' ° as allowing a statutory cause of action
for substantial burdens imposed on the free exercise of religion as a
separate right from the right protected by the First Amendment. 3
Thereafter, en banc rehearing was denied on January 8, 1997,'1 and a
petition for certiorari was filed on April 7, 1997.05 Around the same
time, the Supreme Court was deciding City of Boerne v. Flores.06 In
Flores, which was argued before the Court on February 19, 1997, and
decided on June 25, 1997,1° the Court held that RFRA was
unconstitutional."8 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's holding in
O'Leary was no longer supportable, and when the Court convened
for the 1997 Term, one of its first orders was to GVR the O'Leary
case for further reconsideration in light of Flores.'0 9 A GVR would
appear appropriate in this case because it was clear that Flores
invalidated the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in O'Leary, and it
also would waste time to hear oral argument and issue a plenary
opinion when the issues involved were already decided." 0 In fact,
"remanded," with date restriction in "DA" field for before October 1, 1997, and after
October 1, 1996).
99. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). In BMW, the Court reversed a punitive damage award of
a state court based on a due process challenge for the first time. See id. at 1604. For a
discussion of BMW, see Paul M. Sykes, Note, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme
Court Sets Punitive Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1084 (1997).
100. See Olson & Bush, supra note 8, at B10; see also, e.g., Combustion Engineering,
Inc. v. Johansen, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996) (GVR'ing in light of BMW).
101. 118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
102. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994), held unconstitutional by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997).
103. See Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded,
118 S. Ct. 36 (1997).
104. See id. at 1175.
105. See 65 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. April 15,1997) (No. 96-1598).
106. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
107. See id. at 2157.
108. See id. at 2172. For an analysis of this case, see Katherine A. Murphy, Note, City
of Boerne v. Flores: Another Boost for Federalism, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1424 (1998).
109. See O'Leary v. Mack, 118 S. Ct. 36,36 (1997).
110. Professor Hellman notes that when the Court's docket was not so burdensome,
the Justices were more likely to hear arguments in a number of similar cases. See
Hellman, supra note 2, at 31. The Court has little time for such a luxury now. See id.
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perhaps O'Leary would have become the case announcing the
holding of Flores if it had been the first one to reach the Court; or if it
had been decided later, the Seventh Circuit would have had Flores to
guide its reasoning."' The opportunity to prevent one party from
receiving the correct ruling solely due to an "accident of timing"
made the case a ready one for GVR treatment."2
Although GVRs in light of recent Supreme Court decisions are
the most common type, they also can be granted in light of
intervening state supreme court decisions, federal or state
statutes,"4 or either a change in the legal position or a confession of
error by the Solicitor General."5 These types of GVRs encompass a
smaller portion of GVR practice," 6 but the format is the same: the
Court states that it is remanding "in light of" the intervening legal
event."7 These areas are where the appropriateness of a GVR is less
settled and where debate is more likely to emerge, as in Thomas and
Department of the Interior.
The general considerations involved in a decision to GVR were
first discussed in Henry v. City of Rock Hill.' In Henry, the Court
(noting the "fierce competition" for a slot on the Court's plenary docket).
111. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 31 & n.100 ("That is, if the case had moved more
slowly through the lower courts, it would be decided under the new rule without the need
for Supreme Court intervention; if the case had moved more quickly, it might have been
the one selected for plenary review.").
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282; Alabama v. Ritter, 454 U.S. 885, 885 (1981);
Conner v. Simler, 367 U.S. 486,486 (1961).
114. See, e.g., Gomez v. Fierro, 117 S. Ct. 285, 285 (1996) (GVR'ing in light of new
section of the California penal code); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Nebraskans for Indep.
Banking, Inc., 426 U.S. 310,310-11 (1976) (GVR'ing in light of new state statute).
115. See, e.g., Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286; Schmidt v. Espy, 513 U.S.
801, 801 (1994); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 405 (1981) (per curiam).
Obviously, the Solicitor General is always a party to a GVR of this type. It may seem
strange at first to define one category of GVR solely by the presence of the Solicitor
General as a party; however it must be remembered that the Solicitor General appears
before the Court more often than any other litigant. See BLOCH & KRATrENMAKER,
supra note 11, at 520.
116. The 1996 Term GVR orders break down as follows: forty-nine in light of a
Supreme Court decision, six in light of a new federal statute, three in light of a new
position of the Solicitor General, two in light of a state supreme court decision, and one in
light of a new state statute. Search of WESTLAW, SCr Database (Oct. 16, 1997) (search
for cases containing "granted" within five words of "vacated" within five words of
"remanded," with date restriction in "DA" field for before October 1, 1997, and after
October 1, 1996).
117. See, e.g., Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282 ("The petition for a writ of certiorari is
granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded ... for further consideration
in light of Banks v. LC.L Americas., Inc." (citing 469 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. 1996))).
118. 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam). The Court did not use the term "GVR" but
noted that it had granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further
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initially GVR'd a prior proceeding to the South Carolina Supreme
Court in order to consider it in light of Edwards v. South Carolina,"9
an intervening United States Supreme Court decision.20 On remand,
the South Carolina court reaffirmed its earlier decision by
distinguishing Edwards.' The South Carolina court also expressed
confusion over why the Supreme Court had remanded the case at
all.12
2
When faced with a petition for certiorari in Henry the second
time around, the Court decided to summarily reverse."z The Court's
per curiam opinion noted that, despite the South Carolina Supreme
Court's confusion, that court had correctly concluded that the earlier
remand "did not amount to a final determination on the merits.
124
However, the Court also noted that its order indicated that "Edwards
sufficiently ... and, perhaps, decisive[ly] ... compel[led] re-
examination of the case."'" The Court further noted that this
practice had been used in similar situations when the Court was "not
certain that the case was free from all obstacles to reversal on an
intervening precedent."'26 Confirming its earlier uncertainties, the
Court rejected the state supreme court's distinction and summarily
reversed. 27
Henry revealed a general rule for GVRs: The Court will GVR
when it feels that an intervening event necessitates review of a case
because it might compel, but does not necessarily require, a different
outcome.12 In this way, Henry made clear that a GVR is not the
same as a summary reversal order. 2 9 Henry also confirmed that a
consideration in light of another decision. See id. at 776. In fact, the Court never used the
term "GVR" in an opinion until Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 600, 602 (1996), which
was decided nine months before Thomas and Department of the Interior.
119. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
120. See Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 375 U.S. 6,6 (1963).
121. See City of Rock Hill v. Henry, 135 S.E.2d 718,720 (S.C. 1963).
122. See id. at 718 ("[W]e have endeavored to carry out the mandate of the United
States Supreme Court and find that the light, if any, shed upon [the] instant case by the
Edwards case is not readily or easily discernible.").
123. See Henry, 376 U.S. at 778. Generally, the Court prefers to avoid summary
reversals of state court decisions. See STERN ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.12(c)(5), at 253. It
seems that in this case, any doubts the Court had were cleared up after the GVR. When a
state court decision is (or becomes, as in Henry) clearly erroneous, it is a better candidate
for summary reversal. See id.
124. Henry, 376 U.S. at 777.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 776.
127. See id. at 778.
128. See id. at 776.
129. However, judges and commentators have at times argued that a GVR really
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GVR is appropriate in light of an intervening United States Supreme
Court decision. 3 °
The extent to which the Court considers the merits of a case that
it opts to GVR is not always clear. Justice Stevens shed some light
on this question in his dissent to Board of Trustees v. Sweeney,"' in
which he noted that a decision to grant, vacate, and remand requires
the court to "act[ I on the merits."'3 2 In Sweeney, the Court GVR'd
because it appeared that the First Circuit had imposed a heavier
burden on an employer in an employment discrimination action than
the Court recently had held was correct. 33 However, Justice Stevens
asserted that the intervening decision which the Court requested the
court of appeals to consider did not help in any way and would not
affect the reasoning of the opinion. 34 Finding the distinction the
Court drew to be illusory, he concluded that there was "no legitimate
basis for concluding that the Court of Appeals erred." 135 But in any
event, all the Justices apparently agreed that a GVR is appropriate
only when the intervening decision might have some effect on the
final outcome.'36 To this extent Justice Stevens seems correct in
noting that the Court must at least consider the merits of a claim to
decide if a GVR is appropriate, if only in cursory fashion. 37
implies that the court below should have reached a different result. See, e.g., Sharpe v.
United States, 712 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (Russell, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
Supreme Court was "seeking to be gentle with us" by ordering a GVR); Hellman, supra
note 2, at 6 (discussing Sharpe); Roff, supra note 70, at 476 ("In [GVR'ing] to the
Secretary, the Supreme Court implicitly agreed that the Eighth Circuit's analysis was
incorrect.").
130. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text (discussing that intervening
Supreme Court decisions generate the most GVRs).
131. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
132. Id. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 24. The Court thought that "there is a significant distinction between
merely 'articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' and 'prov[ing] absence
of discriminatory motive.'" Id. at 25 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (" 'articulat[ing] ... ' "); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 569 F.2d 169,
177 (1st Cir. 1978) (" 'prov[ing] ... ' ")). Justice Stevens found this "novel distinction" to
be "illusory and ... unequivocally rejected in [the intervening decision] itself." Id. at 28.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 27-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Here, it perhaps would have been more precise
for Justice Stevens to have said that the Court had no basis to determine that the court of
appeals might have erred, because the majority was careful to note that the First Circuit
had only appeared to impose an incorrect test, not that it certainly had. See id. at 25.
136. Justice Stevens appeared to agree that a GVR would have been appropriate if he
thought the intervening decision shed any light on the case at hand. See id. at 26 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
137. It appears axiomatic that at least some cursory review of the merits would be
necessary-at least enough to determine that the intervening event might have some
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The rationale for issuing a GVR in-light of a state court
decision-the situation in Thomas-arose from a case in which a
GVR was not issued. In the 1944 case of Huddleston v. Dwyer,138 the
Court decided to vacate and remand a court of appeals decision
because of an intervening state supreme court decision. 39
Huddleston arose from a dispute over defaulted municipal paving
bonds."4 After the bondholders had prevailed in district court,' 41 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed 42 and subsequently denied the bond issuer's
petition for rehearing.'43 Following the Tenth Circuit's decision,
however, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma overruled some of the
authorities on which the Tenth Circuit had relied.'" The bond issuer
petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a rehearing, bringing to the court's
attention the intervening Oklahoma case, but the Tenth Circuit again
denied the petition. 45
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 46 and then vacated and
remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit in light of the intervening
effect-but it is unclear that the Court was always doing so. Cf. First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019, 1019 (1971) (GVR'ing in light of new view taken
by the Department of State, and stating that "the Court is expressing no views on the
merits of the case"). However, it appears that the use of the word "merits" here only
implied that the Court was not deciding the outcome of this case, to dispel thoughts that
the Court was implying otherwise by its action. See supra note 129.
138. 322 U.S. 232 (1944) (per curiam).
139. See id. at 237-38.
140. See id. at 233. Dwyer and others were the owners of bonds issued by the city of
Poteau, Oklahoma. See id.
141. See id. In a prior proceeding, the Tenth Circuit held that the bondholders were
entitled to their money and directed the district court to proceed in mandamus to compel
payment if necessary. See Dwyer v. Le Flore County, 97 F.2d 823, 826 (10th Cir. 1938).
After the debts were not paid, the Huddleston case was filed to compel payment. See
Huddleston, 322 U.S. at 234. The district court directed the county commissioners to pay
the debt in ten installments with interest. See id.
142. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 137 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1943), vacated and
remanded, 322 U.S. 232 (1944). The county commissioners claimed that a county had no
power to collect taxes to pay assessments due in an earlier year, under Oklahoma law.
See id. at 385. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument after reviews of Oklahoma
case law, which although unclear, did not seem to prohibit the collection method. See id.
at 385-86.
143. See id. at 383.
144. See Wilson v. City of Hollis, 142 P.2d 633, 640 (Okla. 1943). Wilson held that a
tax levy could be instituted only in the year the assessment is due. See id. at 638. The
court said that such debts could be paid under the procedures provided in the state
constitution and state statutes. See id. at 640. In reaching this result, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court partially overruled three of its prior cases. See id. In Huddleston, the
Tenth Circuit had looked to two of those decisions to find that the power to institute a
levy was broader. See Huddleston, 137 F.2d at 385-86.
145. See Huddleston, 322 U.S. at 235.
146. 321 U.S. 759 (1944).
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events. 47 In a per curiam opinion, the Court noted that "a judgment
of a federal court ruled by state law and correctly applying that law as
authoritatively declared by the state courts ... must be reversed on
appellate review if in the meantime the state courts have disapproved
of their former rulings and adopted different ones."'4 The Court
also noted that the doubt arising from an intervening decision should
properly be decided by those judges "who are familiar with the
intricacies and trends of local law and practice. 149
Although Huddleston appears identical to Thomas at first
glance, the two cases are procedurally different because in
Huddleston (1) certiorari had been granted prior to the vacate and
remand order instead of simultaneously, and (2) oral argument was
heard. 50 Despite these differences, Huddleston has since been cited,
both by Justice Scalia'I and in a per curiam opinion of the Court,5
to support the use of the GVR in light of an intervening state
development.53
Although the Court disposed of Huddleston after oral argument,
it appears that it could have been GVR'd because the intervening
event compelling reconsideration had already occurred before the
petition for certiorari was filed. 4 The Court's decision not to GVR
may have been due in part to its smaller caseload,'55 which may have
allowed time for the Court to hear oral arguments to determine if
remand was appropriate. 6 Another reason a GVR may not have
been used was because GVR orders at that time were rare. 57
147. See Huddleston, 322 U.S. at 237-38.
148. Id. at 236.
149. Id. at 237.
150. See Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611, 611 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in No. 94-9323 and dissenting in No. 94-8988) (discussing Huddleston).
151. See id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152- See Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Continental
Ins. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1731, 1733 (1997) (per curiam).
153. In Lords Landing, the Court appeared to disregard the fact that Huddleston was
not really a GVR. See id. ("Moreover, we have at least once before issued a GVR order
where petitioners notified the federal court of appeals of an intervening state supreme
court's opinion." (citing Huddleston, 322 U.S. at 235)).
154. See Wilson v. City of Hollis, 142 P.2d 633, 633 (Okla. 1943) (decided Oct. 19,
1943); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Huddleston (No. 628) (filed Jan. 24, 1944).
155. See Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604, 606 (1996) (noting that the "infrequent
early use [of the GVR] may be explained in large part by the smaller size of our certiorari
docket in earlier times").
156. Cf. Hellman, supra note 2, at 31 (noting that in the late 1950s the Court was more
willing to hear oral argument in several cases that would raise the same basic issue, even
though the practice may have provided little precedential guidance).
157. See supra note 9 (discussing rarity of GVRs before the 1960s).
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However, the final result in Huddleston was the same as a GVR-a
remand to the lower court to consider an intervening state court
decision.
A GVR in light of a new position taken by the Solicitor
General-the situation in Department of the Interior-is another area
of GVR use. 58 In the 1981 case of Mariscal v. United States,159 the
Court considered a petition for certiorari to the Ninth Circuit, which
had affirmed the petitioner's convictions for multiple counts of
interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud and mail
fraud.' 60 The Ninth Circuit did not actually consider the mail fraud
issues on appeal, but instead invoked the concurrent sentencing
doctrine to affirm the trial court.16' The Court GVR'd based on the
Solicitor General's admission in his petition opposing certiorari that
the convictions below for mail fraud were not valid, 62 and it ordered
the Ninth Circuit to reconsider "the applicability of the 'concurrent
sentence' doctrine to a conviction conceded by the United States to
be erroneous.' 63
Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Mariscal, arguing that the
Court should not "mechanically accept" the Solicitor General's
confession of error in a case in which the Government prevailed, but
should instead either examine the merits before accepting that
position or deny review altogether.'" He believed that the adversary
system was hampered by routine acceptance and cautioned that
"[w]ith the increasing caseloads of all federal courts, there is a natural
temptation to 'pass the buck' to some other court if that is
158. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 287 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This
Court has in recent years occasionally entered a 'GVR' in light of a position newly taken
by the Solicitor General."). The Solicitor General has the job of coordinating and
controlling the appeal of cases involving the federal government that reach the Supreme
Court. See LOuTHAN, supra note 91, at 112-13.
159. 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (per curiam).
160. See id at 405.
161. See id. For a discussion of the concurrent sentencing doctrine, see Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,787-93 (1969).
162. See Mariscal, 449 U.S. at 405 (citing Memorandum in Opposition at 4-5, Mariscal
(No. 80-5618)).
163. Id. at 405-06.
164. See id. at 406-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White dissented without
opinion, "essentially for the reasons stated by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting
opinion." Id. at 406 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted a "certain irony" in
his dissent because the Solicitor General at the time of Mariscal had been a judge on the
Sixth Circuit and had written an opinion that Justice Rehnquist affirmed in a majority
opinion for the Court. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S.
395, 396 (1974). The Maze case affirmed the reversals of criminal convictions for mail
fraud. See Maze, 414 U.S. at 396.
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possible."'165
It is not clear if Mariscal broke new ground because even Justice
Rehnquist noted in his dissent that it was a "routine practice" to
vacate judgments that the Solicitor General claimed were incorrect. 66
In cases prior to Mariscal, the Court had GVR'd in light of a
confession of error by the Solicitor General in which the Court did
not appear to independently review the merits. 67 So, although
Mariscal may not have been the first instance of a GVR granted in
light of a new position taken by the Solicitor General, it certainly
highlighted the existence of the practice and revealed some
disagreement in the Court over its use.'61
The Mariscal type of GVR has been extended to cases in which
the Solicitor General, although confessing error below, argued that
the outcome below was nevertheless correct. In Alvarado v. United
States,'69 the Court GVR'd because it noted the Government's
suggestion that an error had occurred below, although the
Government asserted that the error would not affect the outcome of
the case." ° The Court did not find it novel to GVR "in a case where
165. Mariscal, 449 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that
"Congress ... has not to my knowledge moved the Office of the Solicitor General from
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government to the Judicial Branch." Id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 345 U.S. 968, 968 (1953) (per curiam)
(GVR'ing "in the light of the Government's confession of error," and not mentioning
independent review on the merits). In the 1960s some GVRs occurred in which the Court
claimed to GVR in light of the Solicitor General's position and also in light of the record,
which suggests independent review was pursued. See Millan-Garcia v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 382 U.S. 69, 69 (1965); Rogers v. United States, 378 U.S. 549, 549
(1964) (per curiam); Grabina v. United States, 369 U.S. 426,426 (1962) (per curiam).
168. Perhaps Mariscal denotes the point when now-Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern
over the practice grew strong enough to merit a written dissent. See Mariscal, 449 U.S. at
406-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). There are some hints that he disapproved of the
practice prior to Mariscal. See Corley v. United States, 444 U.S. 806, 806 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dissenting without opinion to GVR'ing in light of new view of
Solicitor General); Rubin v. United States, 439 U.S. 810, 810 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting without opinion to GVR'ing in light of change of position by
Solicitor General); Jackson v. United States, 434 U.S. 947, 947 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting without opinion to GVR'ing in light of new position of Solicitor
General).
169. 497 U.S. 543 (1990) (per curiam).
170. See id. at 544. Alvarado dealt with petitioner's claim that the Government had
used peremptory challenges in order to remove black jurors. See id. at 543. In affirming
petitioner's criminal convictions, the court of appeals held that because the chosen jury
represented a "fair cross section of the community," it did not need to pursue petitioner's
claims that jurors had been stricken on purely racial grounds. Id. at 544. The Solicitor
General agreed that this holding was incorrect, but argued that certiorari should be
denied because the petitioner had not made a prima facie case of discrimination and
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error is conceded but it is suggested that there is another ground on
which the decision below could be affirmed if the case were brought
here."'171 In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that Alvarado
was novel because it extended the practice of GVR'ing in light of a
confession of error "to new lengths."'7 He argued that the decision
would render "the Government's future briefs in opposition much
less explicit and frank than they have been in the past."'73 Such a
result would be undesirable because the Court "depend[s] heavily on
the Government in deciding whether to grant certiorari in cases in
which the Government is a party."'174 Based on Chief Justice
Rehnquist's arguments, it seems possible that when similar cases
arise in the future, the Solicitor General will simply not point out the
error below because such candor could reduce the Government's
chances of success. In at least one case since Alvarado, however, the
Solicitor General has declined to take such an approach. 75
In Diaz-Albertini v. United Statesy'7 6 the Court continued down
the path of Alvarado when it GVR'd in light of the Government's
asserted position in a different case,7 7 even though the Government
because the Government had given race-neutral reasons for the challenges that the
district court accepted and that the court of appeals did not reach. See id.
171. Id. at 544. In support of this claim, the Court cited Chappell v. United States, 494
U.S. 1075, 1075 (1990), in which the Court faced a similar situation and GVR'd without
dissent. See Alvarado, 497 U.S. at 544-45. The Court did not cite any earlier occurrences
of a similar GVR. See id. at 543-45.
172. Alvarado, 497 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
173. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, the Chief Justice was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. See id. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
174. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see infra notes 253-58 and accompanying
text (discussing the importance of the Solicitor General in deciding whether to grant
certiorari).
175. See Williams v. United States, 500 U.S. 901 (1991). The Solicitor General again
confessed error but defended the result below, and the Court GVR'd over a dissent by the
Chief Justice. See id. at 902 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). It would likely be impossible to
know if the Solicitor General declined to point out error in a situation in which the
Solicitor General would defend the result. One former Solicitor General has asserted
that errors can be difficult to spot and are often hidden in the details of a case. See Drew
S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L. REV. 73, 78
(1995). However, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns are logical; if the Solicitor General
knows that admission of an error will make an unwanted GVR more likely, there is a
temptation not to mention the error.
176. 498 U.S. 1061 (1991).
177. See id. at 1062 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The petitioner argued that the Court
should adopt the reasoning of the Government's brief in Chappell v. United States, 494
U.S. 1075 (1990), in which the Government argued that a defendant's right to raise a
collateral attack for a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (1988) was not barred by a failure to raise such a claim on direct appeal. See Diaz-
Albertini, 498 U.S. at 1062 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In Diaz-Albertini, the Solicitor
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distinguished the position taken in the other case and argued that
certiorari should be denied. 78 The Chief Justice again dissented,
asserting that a GVR should not be granted when the Government
does not suggest that error occurred in the court below.1 79
In January 1996, the Court issued a pair of GVR orders that
further explained its use of the GVR. In Stutson v. United States, °80
the Court GVR'd in light of a new position asserted by the Solicitor
General.' The Court said a GVR is appropriate "in light of
potentially pertinent matters which it appears that the lower court
may not have considered. ' ' "m While the Court endorsed then-Justice
Rehnquist's reasoning in Mariscal v. United Statesa83 that the Court
should not "'"mechanically accept"'" any suggestion of the
Solicitor General,184 it found that the circumstances of the case raised
"a reasonable probability that the Court of Appeals will reach a
different conclusion. ' 5  Therefore, a GVR was deemed
appropriate.186
General distinguished Chappell and argued that the particular circumstances of
petitioner's case did not make it unfair to bar a collateral attack under the same statute.
See id. at 1062-63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
178. See Diaz-Albertini, 498 U.S. at 1062 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The petitioner
in this case requested only a GVR instead of plenary review and pointed out the
Government's position in Chappell. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This request
appears to have been a good litigation strategy. See infra notes 260-72 and accompanying
text (recommending that Supreme Court practitioners attempt to characterize their case
as one typically GVR'd in order to elicit similar treatment for their own case).
179. See Diaz-Albertini, 498 U.S. at 1063 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that if the majority did not think the court of appeals decided correctly,
it should have "sa[id] so expressly, rather than leaving it to judges who are just as busy as
we are to do what can best be described as read tea leaves." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
180. 116 S. Ct. 600 (1996).
181. See id. at 602. The merits dealt with a prisoner's failure to receive appellate
review of his conviction for cocaine possession because his notice of appeal arrived one
day past the deadline and arrived at the court of appeals instead of at the district court.
See id. In the lower courts, the Government argued that this neglect precluded the
appeal. See id. In response to the petition for certiorari, the Solicitor General changed
the position of the Government and concluded that the delay could be "excusable
neglect." See id.
182. Id.
183. 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (per curiam).
184. Stutson, 116 S. Ct. at 602 (quoting Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604, 608 (1996)
(quoting Mariscal, 449 U.S. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
185. Id. at 602-03.
186. See id. at 603. The Court noted that, in addition to the change in position by the
Government, six courts of appeals had reached a different outcome and the court of
appeals in this case had only summarily affirmed the result of the district court. See id. at
602.
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In Lawrence v. Chater, 7 the Court again GVR'd in light of a
new position advanced by the Solicitor General that was based on a
new interpretation of the Social Security Act by the Social Security
Administration."s First, the Court stated that the court of appeals
could decide on remand whether to defer to the new agency
interpretation of the statute 9.18  This result echoed the Court's
approach in Henry v. City of Rock Hill9 by noting that if an
"intervening development" makes it reasonably- probable that the
court below might alter its judgment, a GVR is appropriate.'
Second, the Court reaffirmed that GVRs are appropriate in light of a
number of intervening events.'92 Third, from a practical standpoint,
the Court noted that GVRs save courts valuable time by (1) helping
the court below by identifying an issue it may not have fully
considered, and (2) eventually providing the Supreme Court with the
insight of the lower court on that issue if the case comes back up.'93
Additionally, perhaps as a warning to overeager litigants, the
Court noted that it considers the equities of a case when deciding to
GVRY4 The Court warned that if the intervening event advanced is
"part of an unfair or manipulative litigation strategy, or if the delay
and further cost entailed in a remand are not justified by the
potential benefits of further consideration by the lower court, a GVR
187. 116 S. Ct. 604 (1996).
188. See id. at 605, 610.
189. See id. at 610. The Court implied that deference to a new agency interpretation
of a statute may be compelled by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and [the Court consistently follows] the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations." (footnote omitted)). See Lawrence, 116 S.
Ct. at 608.
190. 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam).
191. See Lawrence, 116 S. Ct at 607; Henry, 376 U.S. at 776.
192 See Lawrence, 116 S. Ct. at 606. The Court enumerated a laundry list of cases
involving most of the intervening events discussed in this Note. See id. (citing Schmidt v.
Espy, 513 U.S. 801, 801 (1994) (intervening new administrative interpretation of a federal
statute); Louisiana v. Hays, 512 U.S. 1273, 1273 (1994) (intervening state statute); Wells
v. United States, 511 U.S. 1050, 1050 (1994) (intervening confessions of error and new
position of the Solicitor General); Conner v. Simler, 367 U.S. 486,486 (1961) (intervening
state supreme court decision); Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 329 U.S. 685, 685
(1946) (intervening federal statute)). The Court also noted that GVRs have been granted
for a new position by state attorneys general, see id. (citing Cuffle v. Avenenti, 498 U.S.
996, 996 (1990); Nicholson v. Boles, 375 U.S. 25, 25 (1963) (per curiam)), which is clearly
analogous to a GVR granted due to a new position by the Solicitor General.
193. See id. at 606-07.
194. See id. at 607.
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is inappropriate."' 195 And lastly, the Court noted that a GVR is a
"cautious and deferential alternative to summary reversal.1 96
Therefore, to summarize, it was apparent prior to October 1996
that GVRs could be granted when an intervening development might
change the outcome of a lower court decision, but did not require
such a reversal.Y A GVR did not compel a final determination or
outcome, but it required the Court to examine the merits at least
enough to believe that the intervening development may affect the
outcome of the case.' GVRs could be granted in light of Supreme
Court decisions or state supreme court decisions, federal or state
statutes or regulations, or changes in the position of the Solicitor
General based on factors such as a confession of error below or
elsewhere. 9 And perhaps to assuage a fear of litigants abusing the
power of the GVR, the Court in Lawrence warned parties not to
manipulate its use.210
Thomas and Department of the Interior raise a number of issues
regarding the use of GVRs. Because both cases addressed GVRs in
situations that are less common and that have provided the greatest
source of conflict in the Court,201 they serve to illuminate the
expanding, yet contested, boundaries of GVR use. In terms of
significance, Thomas reveals a dispute in the Court regarding
authority under Rule 10 to GVR and the concomitant problem of
whether the Court should GVR in order to correct errors.' 2°
Department of the Interior serves to illustrate that GVR dissents
195. Id. This consideration possibly addresses Justice Scalia's concern that the
Solicitor General, as one of the "most calculating" litigants before the Court, will attempt
to get GVRs by endorsing new positions. See id. at 616-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
Court also noted that its flexible GVR approach is similar to the standard used for
applications for stays or other summary remedies, which are granted without a judgment
on the merits under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994). See Lawrence, 116 S. Ct.
at 607. However, the Court noted that "the standard that we apply in deciding whether to
GVR is somewhat more liberal than the All Writs Act standard, under which relief is
granted only upon a showing that a grant of certiorari and eventual reversal are
probable." Id. This comparison agrees with the definition of GVR given in Henry that a
GVR is granted when reversal is possible, but not compelled by the intervening
development. See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text (discussing Henry).
196. Lawrence, 116 S. Ct. at 607.
197. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 3-6, 192 and accompanying text.
200. See Lawrence, 116 S. Ct. at 607.
201. GVRs in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions are the most common
type. See Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 611, 613 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
most recent GVRs that have caused debate, such as Thomas and Department of the
Interior, are not of that type.
202. See infra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
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suggest areas of law that the Court might consider in the future. 3 but
it also raises concerns that a GVR order may be unclear in its scope2t 4
and that it may be subject to unfair manipulation by the parties. °5
Finally, both cases yield some practical suggestions for Supreme
Court practitioners.20
6
Justice Scalia argued in Thomas that Rule 10 does not apply in
deciding whether to GVR, °7 which suggests that a separate branch of
reasoning has developed in deciding to issue a GVR as opposed to a
general grant of certiorari.0" Although commentators have said that
the considerations for granting certiorari under Rule 10 are
purposely ambiguous,209 it is fairly clear that the decision to grant a
GVR in light of a state event or of a change in position of the
Solicitor General does not fit into that framework.210  These
intervening events do not fit within any of the Rule 10 factors,
although they do fall within the wide authority of the Court to
remand under 28 U.S.C. § 2106.211 Therefore, Thomas supports the
proposition that certain cases that would not otherwise be deemed
worthy of certiorari under Rule 10 may yet be given consideration by
the Court in the form of a GVR.1 2
203. See infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 226-33,241-50 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 260-72 and accompanying text.
207. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 283 (Scalia, J., concurring).
208. One recent case used Thomas as a guide in deciding to GVR and did not utilize
Rule 10. See Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v.
Continental Ins. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1731, 1732 (1997) (per curiam) (GVR'ing in a situation
"virtually identical" to Thomas on the basis that an intervening development which the
court below may not have considered raised a reasonable probability that the outcome
below was incorrect).
209. See BLOCH & KRATrENMAKER, supra note 11, at 326 ("Rule 10 purports to
describe the various factors that predominantly influence the Court's decision whether or
not to grant a writ of certiorari, but this appears to be at best a checklist of certain
relevant variables."); PERRY, supra note 12, at 34 ("One can be assured that the
ambiguity of Rule 10 is not some unfortunate oversight by the justices."); STERN ET AL.,
supra note 2, § 4.2, at 165 (referring to the "restated generalizations" contained in Rule
10 as "more precisely drawn" than before).
210. See SUP. Cr. R. 10; supra note 47 (quoting Rule 10).
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994); Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604, 606 (1996)
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2106 as granting broad authority to remand); see also supra text
accompanying note 86 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106). One commentator has specifically
noted that 28 U.S.C. § 2106 provides a broader ground of justification for granting
certiorari than Rule 10. See STERN ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.12(c)(3), at 252.
212. In fact, Professor Perry has noted that diversity cases (as Thomas) are in a class
that the Court repeatedly has referred to as frivolous and therefore not worthy of a grant
of certiorari. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 223-24 (stating that one Justice's example of a
diversity case headed for denial was "[w]hen the Court of Appeals didn't appear to
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This consideration does raise a question as to why the Court is
choosing to GVR at all in cases concerning state law. For federal
questions GVR'd in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision
or a change in federal law, Rule 10 does suggest that certiorari can be
granted if the case involves an "important federal question. ' 13 But
when the Court GVRs because of intervening state events, the action
appears to be only a correction of error, which observers and Justices
have noted time and again is not a function of the Supreme Court.2 14
Without any language of Rule 10 on which to rely, the issuance of
GVRs in cases such as Thomas illustrate the observation that "[t]ry
as they might, [the Justices] cannot always resist acting as a court of
last resort. 2 15 Simply put, despite claims that it is not the Supreme
Court's function to correct errors, it may be hard for the Court to
look the other way when an error can easily be corrected by a
GVR.216
understand the law of Arkansas. But that is clearly not the job of the... Court. It is the
responsibility of the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas").
213. Sup. Cr. R. 10. Of course, many GVRs issued in light of a Supreme Court
decision arguably do not present an important federal question. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at
283 (Scalia, J., concurring). Because a GVR does not reveal anything more than the
Court's belief that an intervening event might affect the outcome, it seems a stretch to
argue that an important federal question is always being addressed.
214. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 100 (noting that the Justices claim the Court is not
meant to ensure justice); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT
WAS, How IT IS 269 (1987) ("We are stretched quite thin trying to do what we ought to
do-in the words of Chief Justice Taft, pronouncing 'the last word on every important
issue under the Constitution and the statutes of the United States'-without trying to
reach out and correct errors .... " (quoting 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFr: A BIOGRAPHY 998 (1939))); see also note 53 (discussing
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that the role of the Court is not to correct errors). Chief
Justice Rehnquist reiterated his view on this issue in his dissent to Thomas. See Thomas,
117 S. Ct. at 284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
215. PERRY, supra note 12, at 265. Professor Perry quotes one former Supreme Court
clerk as referring to such summary behavior as "'the Zorro-concept-where they strike
like lightening [sic] to do justice.'" Id. at 100 (quoting an anonymous former Supreme
Court clerk).
216. Cf. Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 600, 602 (1996) (GVR'ing in light of a
change in position by the Government, and noting that "the petitioner is in jail having,
through no fault of his own .... no plenary consideration of his appeal"). The injustice of
such a result seemed to be a factor that made a GVR appropriate. It may seem plausible
that a similar injustice in the civil context could be corrected below through the
application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which provides: "On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons ... or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
Lower federal courts, however, are generally in agreement that Rule 60(b)(6) does not
allow relief based on a change in the law after a final judgment or order is entered. See
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)(6) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Authorizing Relief from Final Judgment or Order for "Any Other
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Considering the Court's heavy workload 17 it is reasonable to
suggest that correction of error should occupy as little time as
possible. In one respect, the brevity of a typical GVR order, which
usually lacks the concurrences or dissents of cases such as Thomas
and Department of the Interior, and the fact that the Court need not
reach a decision on the merits in order to GVR, suggest the simplicity
of the procedure. Therefore, a GVR may be appropriate in those
instances in which the Court cannot resist a temptation to do justice
despite its burgeoning docket.218 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist is
clearly correct that GVRs give courts of appeals extra work, their job
does include error correction.2 9 But on the other hand, it is arguable
that the small amount of time needed to decide to GVR could still be
used more wisely on other matters.220
The Chief Justice's view that the Supreme Court cannot be
troubled with diversity cases such as Thomas suggests that state law
cases are not held in high regard by federal courts.21 However, it
Reason," 15 A.L.R. FED. 193, § 17, at 265 (1973).
217. See Hellman, supra note 13, at 404.
218. See generally WASBY, supra note 10, at 157 ("[S]ummary dispositions do provide
the justices an additional option for cases for which the Court does not have time for full-
dress treatment but on which they wish to act.").
219. The courts of appeals are required to hear all cases that are properly brought
before them. See id. at 44; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) ("The courts of appeals ...
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts .... ).
220. However, it is not clear that much time could be saved by simply denying
certiorari instead of GVR'ing. Currently, the job of reviewing certiorari petitions is
completed mostly by the Supreme Court's law clerks. See BLOCH & KRATITENMAKER,
supra note 11, at 335-36. Many of the Justices have combined their clerks into a "cert
pool" that produces memos on which the Justices rely in making their decisions to grant
certiorari. See id. at 336. Petitions that at least one Justice thinks merit discussion in the
Court's weekly conference are put on the "discuss list," and all other petitions for that
week are automatically denied. See id. In conference, the cases on the discuss list are
voted on separately. See id. at 337. However, sources agree that because the Court's
certiorari workload is so demanding, "discussions at this stage are usually quite
perfunctory; most justices, when their time comes, simply announce their vote." Id.
Assuming that GVR cases are decided by this simple tally, they would not appear to
require extra time. Of course, GVR cases such as Thomas and Department of the Interior
that generate opinions will take up more time because opinions must be written,
circulated, and revised, see REHNQUIST, supra note 214, at 296-303, but denials of
certiorari with accompanying dissents will also generate opinions.
221. Diversity cases in the federal courts of appeals tend to rely on prior federal
decisions in diversity cases rather than state court decisions. See William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 367, 374-75 (1980); cf. Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of
Unit Owners v. Continental Ins. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1731, 1733 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that scheduling a state law case for argument "would require the
investment of still more time and effort in a case that is in the federal courts only by
reason of diversity of citizenship").
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might be better to say that state law cases are not the type of cases
the Supreme Court has the expertise to decide.m One proposal
would be to make the courts of appeals the highest tribunal for state
law questions in the federal courts.P Another suggestion has been
made that applicable state law could be "frozen" at some point in
time to prevent remands years later based on wavering state
precedents.m 4 These proposals do not mean that state law cases are
less important, just that the Supreme Court is not the appropriate
forum for their adjudication.' However, as long as the Supreme
Court has the discretion to review such decisions, a GVR can be an
appropriate mechanism to do so with a minimum of effort.
In addition to being expeditious in diversity cases involving state
law, GVRs also may suggest the Court's future direction in an area of
the law. For example, when the Court GVRs in light of its own prior
decision, it implies that the intervening decision may be applicable to
the case before it.226 But more importantly, it may imply that the
Court is willing to apply the intervening decision more broadly than
is immediately discernible. Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati227 appears to be a recent example
222. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) (noting that remand is
appropriate because the lower courts are better versed in applicable state law).
223. Cf. POSNER, supra note 56, at 210-21 (discussing the effect of limiting diversity
jurisdiction in all federal courts). For example, under the current state of the law, if
Georgia's intervening decision on retroactivity that affected Thomas, see supra note 38
and accompanying text, had been handed down after a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court had been denied, the petitioners in Thomas would have had no recourse
because the judgment of the court of appeals would have been final. See Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (noting that under the doctrine of res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation, even if the judgment "rested
on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case"). Likewise, if a statute were
passed that made state law decisions such as Thomas unreviewable by the Supreme
Court, its enactment would effectively make the decision of the court of appeals final on
questions of state law and bar efforts to appeal to the Supreme Court. Regardless,
including jurisdictional and procedural issues, the Court does not address many diversity
cases. See POSNER, supra note 56, at 210 & n.23 (noting that diversity cases with full
opinions comprised only 1.25% of the Court's full opinions from the 1989 through 1993
Terms).
224. See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 2, at 97.
225. When federal courts apply state law, they must first look to the state court
decisions of that state. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1934) (holding that
federal courts in a diversity action must apply substantive state law); supra note 39
(discussing application of Erie). As a result, it is unlikely that state courts are yearning
for Supreme Court precedents on questions of state law in order to resolve their cases.
226. See, e.g., Bowden v. Francis, 470 U.S. 1079,1079 (1985) (mem.) (GVR'ing in light
of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), with three Justices dissenting because they
thought Ake was not applicable).
227. 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (mem.).
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of this phenomenon. Equality Foundation was GVR'd for further
consideration in light of Romer v. Evansm which struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that prevented enactment of
local ordinances protecting homosexuals.229  Although Equality
Foundation involved a similar denial of such protections, the
provision at issue was a city charter instead of a state constitutional
amendment230 Justice Scalia dissented to this GVR because he did
not see how Romer, in which a state constitutional amendment
denied a locality the freedom to choose, could apply in a case where a
locality exercised this freedom.3 Though Justice Scalia said that
Romer "cannot possibly be thought to have embraced" this
situation, 2 the fact that the Court GVR'd the case indicates that the
scope of Romer is not yet settled.3
In addition to signaling the broader scope of an intervening
Supreme Court decision, dissents from GVRs may "herald the
appearance on the horizon of a possible reexamination" of an area of
law.34 For example, the three Justices who dissented in Department
of the Interior noted that they would have granted full review because
a federal statute had been held unconstitutional. 5 Because the legal
228. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
229. See id. at 1629. For an analysis of Romer, see William M. Wilson III, Note,
Romer v. Evans: "Terminal Silliness," or Enlightened Jurisprudence?, 75 N.C. L. REV.
1891 (1997).
230. See Equality Foundation, 116 S. Ct. at 2519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. In fact, on remand the Sixth Circuit again upheld the constitutionality of the local
ordinance, reasoning that a study of Romer "supplied no rationale for subjecting a purely
local measure of modest scope ... to any equal protection assessment other than the
traditional 'rational relationship' test." Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 298-99 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit decided that
the ordinance met that test because its objectives varied from those of the state
constitutional amendment in Romer. See id. at 300-01.
Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), is another example of the Court
GVR'ing in light of a case that the dissent claimed shed no light on the lower court'sjudgment. See id. at 27-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 131-37 and
accompanying text (discussing Sweeney). By granting a GVR in Sweeney, the Court
suggested that its holding in the intervening decision was applicable to the facts before it,
but the four Justices dissenting from the GVR order did not agree with such a potentially
broader application. See Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 25. As in Equality Foundation, the court of
appeals in Sweeney affirmed its earlier outcome on remand. See Sweeney v. Board of
Trustees, 604 F.2d 106, 108-09 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
234. Brennan, supra note 10, at 480. Justice Brennan was referring to dissents from
denial of certiorari in this statement, but the wisdom of his observation appears equally
applicable to GVR dissents.
235. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 288 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices
O'Connor and Thomas joined Justice Scalia. See id. at 286 (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
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dispute in Department of the Interior dealt with the nondelegation
doctrine, the case suggests that at least three Justices are inclined to
think that the nondelegation area merits re-examination. 2 6
Currently, large delegations of legislative power to agencies by
Congress are routinely upheld. 7 Although some have claimed that
this area of the law is dead,23s there have been proposals for revival of
a stronger nondelegation doctrine that would require more specificity
and definition in statutes that delegate to agencies.z39 The Court did
not choose to examine this area,240 but the dissent in Department of
the Interior may signal future activity.
One danger of a GVR is that its ramifications may be unclear to
the lower court on remand. For example, in one case a lower court
interpreted a GVR in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision
to mean that the intervening decision was to apply retroactively, 24'
but the Court later made it clear that it never decided that
236. Cf. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 956 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that if branches of government can alienate themselves from their assigned
powers, the nondelegation doctrine "is a dead letter," and that the Court's two prior
decisions striking down delegations are "inexplicable"); Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-75 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (cautioning against unprincipled delegations of legislative power); Lisa A.
Cahill & J. Russell Jackson, Note, Nondelegation After Mistretta.: Phoenix or Phaethon?,
31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1047, 1049 (1990) (noting that both Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia appear interested in strengthening the nondelegation doctrine).
237. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996) (upholding a
statute that authorizes the President to list aggravating factors to support the death
penalty for court-martial prosecutions); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412
(1989) (upholding a statute that allows an agency to create criminal sentencing
guidelines).
238. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713,
713 (1969).
239. See, e.g., ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 18-21 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing proposals to revive the
nondelegation doctrine); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 13-19 (1993) (arguing
that delegation "undercuts democracy, undoes the Constitution's most comprehensive
protection of liberty, and ultimately makes government less effective in achieving the
popular purposes of regulating statutes").
240. See Roff, supra note 70, at 476 (noting that the Court "did not address any of the
actual issues raised by the [Eighth Circuit decision] or the nondelegation doctrine
debate").
241. See White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 886 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Fairman v. White, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984) (mem.). The Supreme Court initially
remanded White to the Seventh Circuit in light of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981). See White v. Finkbeiner, 451 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1981). On remand, the Seventh
Circuit found that "[t]he facts of this case are almost identical to those of Edwards" and
therefore reversed its prior decision, White, 687 F.2d at 887, but on appeal the Supreme
Court again GVR'd, this time in light of Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643 (1984)
(holding that Edwards should not apply retroactively). See Fairman, 465 U.S. at 1075.
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question2 42 Similarly, Department of the Interior seems to have
created confusion regarding the availability of judicial review over
the action to acquire title.243 Justice Scalia argued that if judicial
review over the action was truly unavailable under the Quiet Title
Act ("QTA"),244 the Court had no authority to GVR in order to
create the necessary conditions for judicial review. 45 This argument
succeeds only if judicial review definitely was unavailable.246
Nevertheless, because the Court did GVR, the question arises as to
how it gained the power to do so. The Court did not address possible
answers to this question.2 47 The net result is that it is uncertain what
the Court decided, if anything, about the availability of judicial
review under QTA.
Even so, the Secretary of the Interior seems to have interpreted
the GVR order broadly. On remand, the Secretary claimed that
242. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 643 (holding that Edwards should not be applied
retroactively). Thus, the Seventh Circuit had assumed Edwards should have retroactive
effect although the Court had not so held. See supra note 241. Maybe the Court thought
that the Seventh Circuit would consider the retroactivity issue before deciding the effect
of Edwards. See generally Hellman, supra note 2, at 32-33 & n.108 (discussing White and
the problems created by GVRs).
243. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 286 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1994).
245. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 288 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). If judicial review was available under QTA after
acquisition of title, the Court would have power to remand regardless of the view of the
Department of Interior on that issue at the time. If judicial review was not available, then
the federal courts could not review the action.
247. One possibility is that the Court's GVR implied that judicial review after
acquisition of title must be available because otherwise a GVR would not have been
possible. Although the district court ruled that the QTA barred judicial review, the
Eighth Circuit asserted in a footnote that "[w]e doubt whether the Quiet Title Act
precludes APA review of agency action by which the United States acquires title." South
Dakota v. United States Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 881 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995),
vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996). In other words, the Court could dispose of
the case only if it had the power to hear it, and because the Court disposed of it, it must
have had that power. Although one would not expect the Court to decide the issue in
such a manner, it is hard to see how the Court could have GVR'd otherwise. Cf. The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 2, at 96 (noting that the grounds of a vacate and
remand order were unclear, but that "it seems unlikely that the Court would announce...
a rule in so cryptic a manner, despite the implications of the dissenting opinion").
A second possibility is that the Court did not decide the issue of judicial review at all.
The court of appeals noted the existence of judicial review as a factor to consider under
nondelegation principles, see Department of the Interior, 69 F.3d at 881, but it did not rule
on whether judicial review of the claims was barred because it found the statute
unconstitutional, see id. at 885. Therefore, on appeal, the only issue before the Court was
the constitutionality of the statute. Consequently, all the Court did was remand the case
back to the lowest level, the Secretary of the Interior, so that she could reconsider her
decision in light of the new regulation, but nevertheless remaining free to do as she saw
fit.
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Department of the Interior "reopened the decision of the Secretary to
acquire the land in trust."248 Furthermore, the Secretary claimed that
the remand "operate[d] to take the land out of trust so that judicial
review under the APA may be available when the Secretary makes a
decision to accept or reject an application concerning the same
parcels of land."' 4 9 In this light, it appears that the Secretary felt
compelled to reconsider the administrative decision to take the land
in trust as a result of Department of the Interior, which means that she
assumed the GVR validated judicial review."
Perhaps the Court only remanded for reconsideration in light of
the new regulation, but the Secretary was wrong in believing that the
remand compelled her to take the land out of trust and later subject
the land to new proceedings subject to judicial review. Under this
view, the Secretary's decision to take the land out of trust was not
mandatory, but discretionary. Therefore, although the Secretary
believed a new administrative decision was required, it was not,
because the Supreme Court never addressed the availability of
judicial review after acquisition of title. But at the very least,
analyzing this issue in Department of the Interior illustrates that it can
be difficult to determine what a GVR order has actually decided.
Because byzantine explanations of GVR orders are troubling,
Department of the Interior also raises the concern, noted by Justice
Scalia, that the Government will now take advantage of its ability to
obtain a GVR by simply changing its position in light of an
unfavorable decision" Hopefully the Court will heed its own
admonition in Lawrence that "an unfair or manipulative litigation
strategy" will make a GVR inappropriate. 2  This advice should
especially be considered when the Solicitor General is a party. The
Office of the Solicitor General is held in high regard by the Court,z3
which makes it more likely to be able to subtly manipulate the
248. Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 26,551, 26,551 (1997).
249. Id. at 26,552.
250. However, the Court could only compel the Secretary's actions on remand if the
acquired land was subject to judicial review. The Secretary's actions appear to
substantiate Justice Scalia's concern that the Court was "construct[ing] the necessary
conditions for judicial review" when it had no power to do so. Department of the Interior,
117 S. Ct. at 288 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 287 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604,607 (1996).
253. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 113, 128-33; see also Mariscal v. United States, 449
U.S. 405, 406 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Office of the Solicitor
General has "earned over the years a reputation for ability and expertise in presenting
the Government's claims to this Court").
[Vol. 761420
1998] SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1421
outcome of a petition for certiorari. Justice Scalia has expressed
that the practice of GVR'ing when the Government loses below
invites manipulation.25s  While it is possible that cases like
Department of the Interior will arise even when manipulation does
not occur, manipulation seems less likely to occur in cases in which
the Government prevails below. 6 Although the Solicitor General
has a vested interest in maintaining his special status with the
Court,257 the temptation to suggest a GVR in order to vacate an
unwanted outcome may prove to be irresistible.258 But for now,
Department of the Interior appears to reject the view that a line be set
to limit GVRs when the Government is a party to situations in which
the Government prevailed below1 9
Insofar as Thomas and Department of the Interior demonstrate
the Court's liberal use of the GVR, Supreme Court practitioners
should be sure to request a GVR as an alternate ground for granting
certiorari if some intervening event has occurred that comports with
a familiar GVR category.2 0 This request should certainly be made if
the Court is already holding a case for plenary decision on a similar
matter, because most GVRs occur in this fashion.261 As Chief Justice
254. The Solicitor General's success rate of 70% in requesting a grant of certiorari, see
WASBY, supra note 10, at 105-07, is much greater than the overall success rate of about
five percent, see PERRY, supra note 12, at 37, which at least suggests some experience in
crafting successful certiorari petitions.
255. See Department of the Interior, 117 S. Ct. at 287 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. Cf. David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the
Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079,2096 (1994) (noting that some cases demonstrate the
"Government's willingness to sacrifice victory in the immediate case to avoid a ruling on
the merits of some issue"). While Rosenzweig notes that the potential for manipulation
exists, it is logical that the Government would be much more willing to "sacrifice" a loss
than a win.
257. See WASBY, supra note 10, at 106 ("Foremost is the need to protect the [Solicitor
General's] reputation and thus to increase the chance of winning later cases.").
258. See Rosenzweig, supra note 256, at 2111 (noting that strategic confessions of error
to avoid an important but unwanted decision can happen, but that the threat of damaging
the Solicitor General's position in the long run might discourage such abuse).
259. David Gossett suggests that the risk of manipulative positions is mitigated when
the Government endorses a general agency policy as opposed to a position taken in an
individual case. See David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to
Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. C. L. REv. 681, 692 n.50 (1997)
("General positions are less worrisome, since there is a reduced fear of bias."). This
observation suggests another possible line that could be drawn to limit manipulation of
the GVR.
260. The familiar categories are an intervening Supreme Court or state court decision,
a new statute, a new position taken by the Government or agency, or a confession of error
by the Government in the brief in opposition for certiorari in either the present case or in
another case. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. However, this request can also be
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Rehnquist pointed out in Thomas, it is unclear at what point
"dubious" connections between the case at hand and the intervening
event will be too great to GVR,262 but cases that at least appear
related at first glance will likely meet the GVR test.263
Thomas affirms that intervening state supreme court decisions
present grounds for a GVR.264 Practitioners should therefore be
cognizant of whether a state court decision that can have an effect on
a client's case has been issued after a federal court judgment such
that the federal court did not have the opportunity to consider the
effect of the state decision. Therefore, if a state supreme court has
heard arguments on issues relevant to a federal court case but has not
yet issued a decision, it may make sense for the losing party in a
federal forum to apply for certiorari to keep the case alive,265 claiming
that the federal court misapplied state law, in addition to any other
grounds for appeal.266 Then, one may file a supplemental brief after
the state supreme court decision is issued or file a petition for
reconsideration of the decision to deny certiorari, based on the
intervening decision.267
When presenting a petition obviously not meeting any of the
Rule 10 considerations, it may be wise to note that a GVR does not
fit in the normal boundaries of Rule 10, pointing to Justice Scalia's
made in light of other intervening events like those listed supra in note 260.
262. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 285 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
263. Cf. Hellman, supra note 2, at 15 (suggesting that the Court follows a policy of
GVR'ing "all cases in which the petitioner had raised issues similar to those adjudicated
in a recent plenary decision, without looking very closely to determine whether the lower
court's ruling conflicted with the intervening precedent").
264. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 282 (Scalia, J., concurring).
265. Once a judgment is final, later decisions do not affect it. See Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (noting that under the doctrine of res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation, even if the judgment "rested
on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case"). To keep a case alive, a
practitioner can file a petition for certiorari, which generally must be done within 90 days
of the entry of judgment. See SUP. Cr. R. 13.
266. For example, in Thomas, the original petition for certiorari claimed that Georgia
law had been misapplied, in addition to claims of violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Thomas (No. 95-1826). Of course,
the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari simply to correct "erroneous factual findings
or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law," SUP. Cr. R. 10, but Thomas
suggests that the Court may still intervene in order to do justice. See supra notes 213-20
and accompanying text. Those considering the soundness of such a strategy should
consider whether the expense of filing is justifiable, although petitioners filing in forma
pauperis do not have to pay any fees. See PERRY, supra note 12, at 102.
267. In Thomas, the petitioner's supplemental brief was the first to point out the
relevant intervening decision. See Thomas, 117 S. Ct. at 285 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In regards to the procedure for rehearing of an order denying certiorari, see SUP. Cr. R.
44.
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observation in Thomas that Rule 10 is not controlling and that the
test for a GVR should be whether there has been an intervening
event that compels reconsideration.2" The broad language of 28
U.S.C. § 2106 can also be used as support for the power to GVR.269
Because the Court often cites older GVRs as precedent for the
appropriateness of more recent ones, a practitioner should also cite
to cases that presented a similar procedure pattern to the Court and
received a GVR.2 70 The Court's willingness to GVR in a case similar
to Thomas later in the 1996 Term, citing Thomas approvingly for the
authority to do so,271 confirms that the considerations for GVR'ing
are truly a separate inquiry from the regular practice of granting
certiorari. 272
In conclusion, Thomas and Department of the Interior shed some
light on when GVRs may be granted outside of the normal practice
of remanding for consideration of recent plenary decisions. They
demonstrate that GVRs can reach cases that do not consider
important federal questions, and they demonstrate a conflict over
what the proper role of the Court should be, if any, in being the final
arbiter of justice. Although a GVR represents a case the Court has
"decided not to decide," it also says something about what issues the
Court thinks need to be decided. Notwithstanding any problems,
such as a potential for manipulation or unclear holdings, that are
raised by GVRs, "the GVR practice prevents the Court from
becoming, even more than it already is, a remote lawgiver cut off
from the traditional processes of common-law adjudication."'27
J. MITCHELL ARMBRUSTER
268. See id. at 283 (Scalia, J., concurring).
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994); supra text accompanying note 86 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 in pertinent part).
270. Likewise, perhaps a party opposing certiorari could dig through old petitions that
were denied and that presented a similar situation to the Court. However, such a strategy
is frustrated by the fact that denial of certiorari is not supposed to have any precedential
effect. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1973);
LOUrHAN, supra note 91, at 82.
271. See Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Continental
Ins. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1731,1732 (1997) (per curiam).
272. See id. (noting that "[tihis case fits within the category of cases in which we have
held it is proper to issue a GVR order").
273. Arthur D. Hellman, "Granted, Vacated, and Remanded"-Shedding Light on a
Dark Comer of Supreme Court Practice, 67 JuDICATURE 389, 401 (1984).
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